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REMEDYING THE REMEDY: JOHNSON v. 
URIBE AND DETERMINING PREJUDICE 
FOR SIXTH AMENDMENT CLAIMS 
KEITH KESSINGER* 
Abstract: On November 5, 2012, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals declined to 
rehear Kennard G. Johnson’s habeas petition en banc, thus upholding the appel-
late panel’s decision to vacate his guilty plea for want of effective assistance of 
counsel, which overturned the district court’s resentencing remedy. The panel 
worked within the standard of review to establish prejudice during the plea nego-
tiations, which provided not only an appropriate remedy but also a pragmatic 
framework for lower courts to assess similar claims of ineffective assistance of 
counsel. In dissent to the denial of rehearing en banc, Chief Judge Alex Kozinski 
reasoned that the appellate panel abused its own discretion by not showing the 
proper deference to the district court’s findings and misapplying the test for inef-
fective assistance of counsel. Ultimately, the Ninth Circuit panel provided a 
workable Sixth Amendment framework for the lower courts to follow. This 
framework diminishes the chance that future indigent defendants, like Johnson, 
will have to suffer the injustice of receiving ineffective assistance of counsel with 
an inadequate remedy on appeal. 
INTRODUCTION 
In September 2006, Kennard G. Johnson was in custody and awaiting tri-
al in California for theft-related felonies pertaining to defrauding an auto deal-
ership.1 To witness the birth of his child, Johnson entered into a Vargas waiver, 
which allowed for Johnson to be released on his own recognizance in ex-
change for a guilty plea to all of the charges and enhancements as well as a 
prison sentence of fourteen years and four months.2 If Johnson complied with 
the conditions of his release and returned for resentencing, the prosecutor 
would consent to a reduced sentence of six years.3 After Johnson failed to ap-
                                                                                                                           
 * Staff Writer, BOSTON COLLEGE JOURNAL OF LAW & SOCIAL JUSTICE (2013–2014). 
 1 See Johnson v. Uribe (Johnson III), 700 F.3d 413, 420–21 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 134 S. 
Ct. 617 (2013); People v. Johnson (Johnson I), No. E045514, 2009 WL 1365764 (Cal. Ct. App. June 
17, 2009). 
 2 See Johnson III, 700 F.3d at 421–22; People v. Vargas, 273 Cal. Rptr. 48, 52 (1990) (upholding 
a structured plea, in which defendant receives a longer sentence for failing to appear at a future hear-
ing). 
 3 Johnson III, 700 F.3d at 422. 
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pear for resentencing, which violated his Vargas waiver, the state court im-
posed the sentence of fourteen years and four months.4 
Johnson later learned that his sentence exceeded the California statutory 
maximum because some of the enhancements were not compliant with the Cal-
ifornia Penal Code.5 Johnson’s attorney, Deputy Public Defender David 
Durdines, did not notice this error when negotiating the Vargas waiver because 
he failed to research possible sentencing options for the charges and enhance-
ments.6 
After exhausting his state appeals, Johnson filed a habeas corpus petition 
in the United States District Court for the Central District of California.7 John-
son alleged ineffective assistance of counsel, a Sixth Amendment violation, 
because Durdines failed to adequately advise him prior to the Vargas plea 
agreement or object to his sentence in court.8 The district court agreed and or-
dered the state court to either resentence Johnson within one hundred and 
twenty days to a lawful sentence or release him.9 On appeal, a three-judge 
panel for the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s deci-
sion but vacated the remedy.10 The panel reasoned that the ineffective assis-
tance of counsel tainted the entire plea negotiations and vacating the guilty 
plea was the only way to return Johnson to the position he would have been in 
had no Sixth Amendment violation occurred.11 On its own motion, the Ninth 
Circuit ultimately declined to rehear Johnson’s case en banc.12 In dissent, Chief 
Judge Alex Kozinski argued that the Ninth Circuit panel did not afford the dis-
trict court the proper deference and abused its own discretion in vacating the 
district court’s remedy.13 
Part I of this Comment summarizes the factual and procedural history of 
Johnson’s criminal case. Part II then examines how the Ninth Circuit panel 
applied the abuse-of-discretion standard to the district court’s decision, leading 
to a stronger finding of prejudice and a divergent habeas remedy. Finally, Part 
                                                                                                                           
 4 Id. 
 5 See id. at 421–22; Johnson v. Uribe (Johnson II), No. EDCV 10-0164-GW (RC), 2010 WL 
5671780, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 12, 2010), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 700 F.3d 413 (9th Cir. 2013) 
(noting that the prosecution improperly added three prior crime enhancements to Johnson’s amended 
charges); see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 667.5 (West 2012) (describing which enhancements may add 
to a defendant’s felony prison term). 
 6 See Johnson III, 700 F.3d at 421–22, 425–26. 
 7 See id. at 422–23. In his state appeals, Johnson argued Durdines improperly advised him to 
accept a plea agreement that violated both California’s penal code and appellate case law. Johnson I, 
2009 WL 1365764, at *2. 
 8 Johnson III, 700 F.3d at 423; see Johnson II, 2010 WL 5671780, at *2; see also U.S. CONST. 
amend. VI. 
 9 See Johnson III, 700 F.3d at 423; Johnson II, 2010 WL 5671780, at *18. 
 10 Johnson III, 700 F.3d at 420. 
 11 See id. at 427. 
 12 See id. at 415. 
 13 See id. at 416–17 (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting). 
2014] Determining Prejudice for Sixth Amendment Claims 65 
III argues that the panel established a pragmatic framework to assess Sixth 
Amendment challenges in the context of plea negotiations and provided clear 
guidance for prisoners to vindicate their constitutional rights. 
I. FROM ARREST TO HABEAS APPEAL 
On August 16, 2005, Kennard G. Johnson was charged with three felonies 
and various criminal history enhancements, in relation to submitting a fraudu-
lent check to a car dealership and providing false information on a credit appli-
cation in order to steal a car.14 Johnson pled not guilty and was initially re-
leased on conditional own-recognizance status, pending a preliminary hear-
ing.15 
At the preliminary hearing on April 10, 2006, Johnson met his defense 
counsel, Deputy Public Defender David Durdines, for the first time.16 That 
day, Johnson and Durdines spoke only briefly in the courtroom and their sub-
sequent communication over the next five months was limited to when John-
son appeared in court, with each conversation lasting only a couple of 
minutes.17 Durdines did not ask Johnson about his criminal background or 
about the events leading to the arrest.18 
On April 19, 2006, Johnson pled not guilty at his arraignment, where he 
faced the same charges as well as two prior strikes and prison terms.19 On May 
26, 2006, the prosecution amended the charges, adding a count for forgery and 
three additional prison terms as enhancements to Johnson’s sentence.20 Alt-
hough the additional prison terms were not proper under California Penal Code 
§ 667.5(b), they were included as enhancements.21 With Durdines as counsel, 
Johnson pled not guilty, but they did not discuss the amended charges or en-
hancements.22 
After failing to appear at his June 16, 2006 hearing, the court revoked 
Johnson’s bail.23 At a pretrial hearing on September 8, 2006, Johnson told 
                                                                                                                           
 14 Johnson v. Uribe (Johnson III), 700 F.3d 413, 420 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 617 
(U.S. Nov. 12, 2013). 
 15 Id. at 420–21. 
 16 Id. at 421. 
 17 Id. 
 18 Id. Following his preliminary hearing, Johnson was held to answer for every felony charge. Id. 
 19 Id.; Johnson v. Uribe (Johnson II), No. EDCV 10-0164-GW (RC), 2010 WL 5671780, at *6 
(C.D. Cal. Nov. 12, 2010). 
 20 Johnson III, 700 F.3d at 421. 
 21 Id. at 421, 423; Johnson II, 2010 WL 5671780, at *13; see CAL. PENAL CODE § 667.5 (West 
2012). 
 22 Johnson III, 700 F.3d at 421. Prior to May 30, 2006, Johnson rejected a plea offer of five years 
and a strike. Id. Johnson had discussed the potential plea with Durdines for two or three minutes but was 
not advised by Durdines whether to accept the deal. Id. 
 23 Johnson II, 2010 WL 5671780, at *7. 
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Durdines that he wanted to be released to witness the birth of his child.24 The 
prosecutor would only agree to a release, however, if Johnson entered into a 
Vargas waiver, which required a guilty plea to all the charges and enhance-
ments.25 If Johnson agreed to these terms and complied with the conditions of 
his release, the prosecutor would recommend a sentence of six years at resen-
tencing and would not file new charges against Johnson for failing to appear at 
his hearing on June 16, 2006.26 If Johnson failed to comply with the conditions 
of the release, the prosecutor would recommend a sentence of fourteen years 
and four months.27 
Before relaying the plea offer to Johnson, Durdines failed to discover that 
the sentence of fourteen years and four months exceeded the maximum statuto-
ry sentence that Johnson could receive.28 Nevertheless, Johnson agreed to the 
Vargas waiver, and the court accepted the agreement.29 After his release, John-
son appeared at Superior Court for resentencing on September 22, 2006.30 The 
district court rescheduled the resentencing to September 29, 2006, and Johnson 
failed to appear for that hearing.31 On March 21, 2008, the California Superior 
Court held that Johnson violated the terms of his Vargas waiver and imposed a 
prison sentence of fourteen years and four months.32 
On February 2, 2010, after exhausting his state appeals, Johnson filed a 
habeas petition in the United States District Court for the Central District of 
California to vacate his unlawful sentence.33 Johnson argued that Durdines 
provided ineffective assistance of counsel, a Sixth Amendment violation, be-
cause he failed to adequately advise him during the plea process or object to 
the sentence.34 
Magistrate Judge Rosalyn Chapman of the United States District Court 
for the Central District of California agreed that Johnson received ineffective 
assistance of counsel and recommended that the district court grant the habeas 
petition.35 As for the remedy, she concluded that Johnson would have accepted 
the Vargas waiver if Durdines ensured that the maximum sentence fell within 
                                                                                                                           
 24 Johnson III, 700 F.3d at 421 
 25 Id. at 421–22 (citing People v. Vargas, 273 Cal. Rptr. 48 (1990)). 
 26 Id. at 422. 
 27 Id. 
 28 Id. 
 29 Id. 
 30 Id. 
 31 Id. 
 32 Id. 
 33 Id. at 423. 
 34 Id.; see also U.S. CONST. amend. VI; Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1390–91 (2012) (hold-
ing that ineffective assistance of counsel led to defendant not accepting favorable plea deal, resulting 
in harsher sentence after trial). 
 35 Johnson III, 700 F.3d at 423; Johnson II, 2010 WL 5671780, at *18. 
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the statutory limits.36 The district court accepted the magistrate judge’s rec-
ommendations and ordered for Johnson to be released within one hundred 
twenty days, unless the San Bernardino County Superior Court properly resen-
tenced Johnson within that timeframe.37 On March 4, 2011, the San Bernardino 
County Superior Court reduced Johnson’s maximum sentence to eleven years 
and four months, which was within California’s statutory limits.38 
On January 31, 2011, Johnson appealed the district court’s ruling, arguing 
that the court should vacate his entire conviction.39 A three-judge panel for the 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s grant of habeas 
relief but vacated the remedy.40 The panel reasoned that Durdines’s ineffective 
assistance tainted the entire plea negotiations, not just the sentence calcula-
tion.41 As a result, the panel held that vacating the guilty plea was the only way 
to place Johnson in his original position, before the Sixth Amendment viola-
tion occurred.42 
Concerned about a potential abuse of discretion by the panel, the Ninth 
Circuit then considered on its own motion whether to rehear Johnson’s case en 
banc.43 Ultimately, the Ninth Circuit declined to rehear the case, over the dis-
sent of Chief Judge Kozinski.44 Among the objections, Kozinski argued that 
the panel abused its discretion because it did not afford the district court the 
proper deference and misapplied the test for ineffective assistance of counsel.45 
II. REMEDYING AN INADEQUATE REMEDY 
The Ninth Circuit panel acknowledged that Johnson received ineffective 
assistance of counsel but rejected the district court’s remedy as an abuse of 
discretion.46 Relying on the magistrate judge’s findings, the panel determined 
that Durdines prejudiced Johnson’s defense at an earlier stage and crafted a 
remedy that cured the entire Sixth Amendment violation.47 In dissent, Chief 
Judge Kozinski argued that it was Johnson’s burden to demonstrate, with a 
                                                                                                                           
 36 Johnson III, 700 F.3d at 423; Johnson II, 2010 WL 5671780, at *17. 
 37 Johnson III, 700 F.3d at 423; see 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) (2006) (allowing a magistrate judge 
to convene a habeas hearing as well as issue findings and recommendations to the district court for 
post-conviction relief). 
 38 Johnson III, 700 F.3d at 423. 
 39 Id. at 420, 423. 
 40 See id. at 420. 
 41 See id. at 420, 426–27. 
 42 See id. at 427. 
 43 See id. at 415 (denying the petition to rehear the case en banc); id. at 416–18 (Kozinski, C.J., 
dissenting). 
 44 See id. at 415 (majority order denying rehearing); id. at 416 (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting). 
 45 See id. at 416–18 (Kozinski, C.J, dissenting). 
 46 See Johnson v. Uribe (Johnson III), 700 F.3d 413, 420, 426 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 134 S. 
Ct. 617 (2013). 
 47 See id. at 427–28. 
68 Boston College Journal of Law & Social Justice [Vol. 34:E. Supp. 
greater level of certainty, that Durdines prejudiced the defense during the plea 
negotiations.48 Chief Judge Kozinski stated that resentencing was the proper 
remedy because the district court was unable to determine with certainty any 
prejudice to Johnson before the miscalculated plea.49 
A. The Ninth Circuit Panel Determines Prejudice and Vacates the Remedy 
The Ninth Circuit panel vacated Johnson’s guilty plea after determining 
that the district court’s remedy was an abuse of discretion.50 Within the Ninth 
Circuit, a court abuses its discretion when it makes an error of law, rests its 
decision on clearly erroneous findings of facts, or commits a clear error of 
judgment.51 To reach that determination, the panel followed the Ninth Circuit’s 
two-pronged test and considered (1) whether the district court identified the 
correct legal standard for its decision, and (2) whether the district court’s find-
ings and application of facts to the correct legal standard were “illogical, im-
plausible or without support in inferences that may be drawn from facts in the 
record.”52 
Relying on the magistrate judge’s findings and Sixth Amendment princi-
ples from recent Supreme Court decisions, the panel implied that the district 
court identified ineffective assistance of counsel as the correct legal standard.53 
Nevertheless, the panel rejected the lower court’s assumption that Johnson 
would have accepted a legal Vargas waiver with effective counsel.54 Such an 
assumption, the panel suggested, was an illogical abuse of discretion because it 
did not recognize that Johnson was prejudiced throughout the plea-bargaining 
process.55 
As the panel noted, to remedy a Sixth Amendment violation, courts are 
required to neutralize the taint of the constitutional violation and return the 
defendant back to the position before the violation occurred.56 In determining 
the proper remedy, the panel relied on the Supreme Court’s framework for in-
effective assistance of counsel, established in Strickland v. Washington.57 Fol-
                                                                                                                           
 48 See id. at 418 (Kozinski, C.J, dissenting). Because Johnson III was amending a previous deci-
sion and denying a rehearing en banc, Chief Judge Kozinski’s dissenting opinion preceded the majori-
ty opinion. See id. at 416–19; see also Johnson v. Uribe, 682 F.3d 1238, amended and superseded by 
700 F.3d 413 (2012). 
 49 See Johnson III, 700 F.3d at 417 (Kozinski, C.J, dissenting). 
 50 Id. at 420, 426. (majority opinion). 
 51 Id. at 424 (citing United States v. Ressam, 679 F.3d 1069, 1086 (9th Cir. 2012)). 
 52 See id. at 424 n.5; United States v. Hinkson, 585 F.3d 1247, 1251 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 53 See Johnson III, 700 F.3d at 424–25. 
 54 See id. at 426–27. 
 55 See id. 
 56 See id. at 425. 
 57 See id. at 424–25, 427; id. at 417–18 (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that the panel misap-
plied the Strickland v. Washington framework); see also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 
(1984) (establishing the test for ineffective assistance of counsel). 
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lowing Strickland, the petitioner must demonstrate that (1) counsel’s deficient 
performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) the 
deficient performance prejudiced the defense.58 
The panel then relied on principles established in recent Supreme Court 
cases, Missouri v. Frye and Lafler v. Cooper.59 In Frye, the Court emphasized 
that the Sixth Amendment applies to “all ‘critical’ stages of the criminal pro-
ceedings” and “that defense counsel have responsibilities in the plea bargain 
process . . . that must be met to render the adequate assistance of counsel.”60 
Furthermore, in Lafler, the Supreme Court concluded that “[i]f a plea bargain 
has been offered, a defendant has the right to effective assistance of counsel in 
considering whether to accept it.”61 
In applying these principles to the magistrate judge’s findings, the panel 
traced Durdines’s deficient performance to when the prosecution amended the 
charges with the erroneous sentencing calculation.62 The panel reasoned that 
Durdines’s lack of investigation into the sentencing enhancements as well as 
his misunderstanding of California Penal Code § 667.5(b) fell below an objec-
tive standard of reasonableness, satisfying the first prong of Strickland.63 The 
panel also reasoned that Durdines’s failure to object to the illegal sentencing 
enhancements fundamentally weakened Johnson’s bargaining position and 
tainted the plea negotiations, which in turn constituted prejudice and satisfied 
the second prong of Strickland.64 The panel stated that if Durdines properly 
objected to the illegal enhancements, Johnson may have received more favora-
ble plea offers.65 
As a result, the panel vacated the guilty plea because the district court’s 
remedy “[did] not go far enough” to account for the prejudice that occurred 
during the plea negotiations.66 The panel therefore implied that the district 
court’s inadequate resentencing remedy was an abuse of discretion because it 
was illogical.67 According to the panel, vacating the guilty plea was the only 
logical remedy that cured the entire Sixth Amendment violation and restored 
Johnson to the position before the constitutional violation.68 
                                                                                                                           
 58 See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. 
 59 See Johnson III, 700 F.3d at 424, 426; see also Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1405, 1407 
(2012); Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1387 (2012). 
 60 Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1405, 1407; see Montejo v. Lousiana, 556 U.S. 778, 786 (2009). 
 61 Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1387. 
 62 See Johnson III, 700 F.3d at 427. 
 63 See id. at 424–25, 427. 
 64 See id. at 426–27. 
 65 See id. at 427. 
 66 See id. at 426–27. 
 67 See id. 
 68 See id.; see also Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1389 (emphasizing resentencing is inadequate remedy for 
all Constitutional violations); see also U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
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B. In Dissent: Requiring Certainty to Establish Prejudice 
Chief Judge Kozinski’s application of the Strickland test differed from the 
panel’s, attaching prejudice only to the miscalculated sentence.69 Chief Judge 
Kozinski conceded that Durdines provided lackluster representation, but he 
noted that the panel only found a “mere suspicion of prejudice” in the plea ne-
gotiations, implying that the panel’s findings did not satisfy Strickland’s sec-
ond prong or warrant a habeas remedy.70 
Chief Judge Kozinski stated that it was Johnson’s burden to demonstrate 
with a greater certainty that Durdines’s deficient performance prior to the plea 
prejudiced Johnson’s defense.71 Instead, he noted the panel engaged in “un-
tethered speculation” to find prejudice during the plea negotiations.72 
Chief Judge Kozinski concluded that the district court could only find, 
with any measure of certainty, that Durdines prejudiced Johnson’s defense dur-
ing the miscalculated plea.73 As a result, Chief Judge Kozinski reasoned that 
the district court’s resentencing remedy was not an abuse of discretion because 
it cured the concrete constitutional violation in the only logical way that was 
permitted.74 
III. THE CASE AGAINST AN APPELLATE RUBBERSTAMP 
The Ninth Circuit panel’s analysis in Johnson v. Uribe is a boon for both 
district courts and prisoners, as it provides a workable framework for Sixth 
Amendment challenges involving plea negotiations, an area that the Supreme 
Court has acknowledged but has provided little guidance.75 Contrary to Chief 
                                                                                                                           
 69 See Johnson III, 700 F.3d at 417 (Kozinski, C.J, dissenting). 
 70 See id. at 417–18. 
 71 See id. 
 72 See id. at 418. Chief Judge Kozinski stated the “untethered speculation” took the form of the 
panel’s inability to predict the outcome of the hypothetical plea negotiations with effective assistance 
of counsel. See id. As a result, the panel did not want Johnson “‘prejudiced by that uncertainty,’” 
which conflicts with the Strickland standard, according to Chief Judge Kozinski. See id. at 418 (quot-
ing the majority opinion). 
 73 See id. at 417–18. 
 74 See id. 
 75 See Johnson v. Uribe (Johnson III), 700 F.3d 413, 426–28 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 134 S. 
Ct. 617 (2013); Richard E. Myers II, The Future of Effective Assistance of Counsel: Rereading Cronic 
and Strickland in Light of Padilla, Frye, and Lafler, 45 TEX. TECH L. REV. 229, 238 (2012) (highlight-
ing the Supreme Court’s recent willingness to entertain Sixth Amendment challenges involving pretri-
al conduct, but noting that the Court has narrowly tailored its decisions, leaving litigators with little 
guidance and many unanswered questions); see also Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1388 (2012) 
(holding that a defendant has a valid ineffective assistance of counsel claim if the defendant rejected a 
plea due to counsel’s error and received a more severe sentence than offered in the rejected plea); 
Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1405, 1409 (2012) (holding that defendants may have a Sixth 
Amendment claim when counsel does not communicate formal plea offers); Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 
U.S. 356, 374 (2010) (holding that defendants receive ineffective assistance of counsel when they are 
not informed by counsel that a plea carries risk of deportation). 
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Judge Kozinski’s fears, this decision does not upend federal habeas review for 
ineffective assistance of counsel claims.76 Rather, the panel respected the pre-
cepts of appellate review, as it made rational inferences from the record to es-
tablish prejudice during the plea negotiations.77 To fashion an appropriate 
Sixth Amendment remedy, the panel relied on recent Supreme Court deci-
sions—unavailable to the district court—mandating that defendants are enti-
tled to effective assistance of counsel throughout the plea bargaining process.78 
In particular, Chief Judge Kozinski’s dissent, if adopted, would severely 
curtail the abuse-of-discretion standard, inhibiting an important check on ha-
beas remedies.79 By requiring the magistrate judge to expressly find ineffective 
assistance of counsel during the plea negotiation process, Chief Judge 
Kozinski’s position would prevent appellate courts from reviewing how the 
lower courts apply facts to the law, thereby eliminating the second-prong of the 
abuse-of-discretion test.80 As a result, Chief Judge Kozinski’s dissent would 
turn the abuse-of-discretion standard into a rubberstamp, where appellate 
courts could overturn decisions only when the district court incorrectly identi-
fies the legal standard.81 
                                                                                                                           
 76 See Johnson III, 700 F.3d at 427–28; id. at 416–18 (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that the 
panel’s decision both contradicts the Supreme Court’s instructions to leave the choice of habeas reme-
dies with the district court and disregards the Ninth Circuit’s own abuse of discretion standard). 
 77 See id. at 425–28 (majority opinion) (holding that the district court’s remedy was an abuse of 
discretion because it did not fully consider the rational inferences from the magistrate judge’s find-
ings); see also United States v. Hickson, 585 F.3d 1247, 1251 (9th Cir. 2009) (noting that the Ninth 
Circuit’s abuse of discretion test requires the appellate court to examine whether the lower court ra-
tionally applied the correct legal standard to the findings of facts); see also Marbury v. Madison, 5 
U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 147–48 (1803) (acknowledging that appellate tribunals are meant to review low-
er court decisions for “fact as well as law”). 
 78 See Johnson III, 700 F.3d at 424–25 (relying on Frye and Lafler to fashion a remedy and not-
ing that Johnson appealed the district court’s decision to the panel in 2011—more than a year before 
the Supreme Court decided Lafler and Frye); see also Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1388 (explaining that “the 
right to adequate assistance of counsel cannot be defined or enforced without taking account of the 
central role plea bargaining plays in securing convictions and determining sentences”); Frye, 132 S. 
Ct. at 1407 (explaining that “[t]he reality is that plea bargains have become so central to the admin-
istration of the criminal justice system that defense counsel have responsibilities in the plea bargain 
process, responsibilities that must be met to render the adequate assistance of counsel that the Sixth 
Amendment requires”). 
 79 See Johnson III, 700 F.3d at 416–18 (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting); Hill v. Humphrey, 662 F.3d 
1335, 1385 (11th Cir. 2001) (Martin, J., dissenting) (acknowledging that while federal courts must 
accord state criminal convictions substantial deference in habeas proceedings, federal courts must also 
“be vigilant to ‘guard against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems’” (quoting 
Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 786 (2011))); Nathaniel Koslof, Comment, Insurmountable 
Hill: How Undue AEDPA Deference Has Undermined the Atkins Ban on Executing the Intellectually 
Disabled, 54 B.C. L. REV. E. SUPP. 189, 194 (2013) (explaining that an overly deferential standard of 
review of habeas petitions will preclude legitimate constitutional challenges). 
 80 See Johnson III, 700 F.3d at 416 (Kozinski, C.J, dissenting); see also id. at 424 n.5 (majority 
opinion) (discussing the Ninth Circuit’s two-pronged abuse of discretion test). 
 81 See id. at 416 (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting); see also id. at 424 n.5 (majority opinion) (noting that 
the first prong only requires the district court to identify the correct legal standard). 
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Moreover, Chief Judge Kozinski proposed an exceedingly strict prejudice 
requirement under the Strickland test that would sharply depart from recent 
Supreme Court jurisprudence and practically hollow the Sixth Amendment’s 
guarantee of effective assistance of counsel.82 By failing to provide adequate 
counsel during the plea negotiation process, Durdines indisputably violated his 
fundamental Sixth Amendment responsibilities to Johnson.83 Nonetheless, 
Chief Judge Kozinski argued that if Johnson received a lawful sentence, 
Durdines would have provided constitutionally adequate counsel—despite the 
lack of communication with Johnson or research into sentencing alternatives.84 
To justify this untenable position, Chief Judge Kozinski reasoned that the mis-
calculated sentence was the only error that satisfied Strickland’s prejudice re-
quirement, and he dismissed the panel’s other prejudice determination as “un-
tethered speculation.”85 Hence, his view effectively bar defendants from Sixth 
Amendment challenges after they pled guilty to a lawful sentence.86 
Such an exacting prejudice finding, as Chief Judge Kozinski advocated, 
would destroy any accountability for defense attorneys during the plea bargain-
ing process.87 The panel’s remedy relied on the magistrate judge’s conclusions, 
which stated that Durdines conducted the plea negotiations with an incorrect 
and incomplete understanding of the law and facts of the case, and that John-
                                                                                                                           
 82 Compare id. at 416–18 (Kozinski, C.J, dissenting) (arguing there is no prejudice so long as the 
accepted plea was lawful), with Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1385 (noting that a showing of prejudice only 
requires the defendant to show a reasonable probability that a different plea offer, with less strict 
terms, would have been offered to a defendant with adequate assistance of counsel), and Frye, 132 S. 
Ct. at 1409 (holding that defendants may show Strickland prejudice by demonstrating a reasonable 
probability that they would have accepted an earlier plea offer had they received effective assistance 
of counsel) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)), and Hill v. Lockhart, 474 
U.S. 52, 59 (1985) (holding that, to satisfy Strickland, defendants must show reasonable probability 
that, with adequate assistance of counsel, they would not have accepted a valid plea and instead would 
have insisted on trial) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687). 
 83 See Johnson III, 700 F.3d at 425–26. In particular, Durdines failed to conduct an adequate 
investigation, which led to his incorrect and incomplete understanding of the law and facts of the case. 
See Johnson v. Uribe (Johnson II), No. EDCV 10-0164-GW, 2010 WL 5671780, at *13 (C.D. Cal. 
Nov. 12, 2010) (finding that Durdines did not perform an adequate investigation into the facts of 
Johnson’s case before entering the guilty plea); see also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690–91 (holding that 
counsel has a duty to investigate the facts of the case and must understand the relevant law to be able 
to provide adequate counsel). As a result, Johnson received ineffective assistance of counsel when he 
was not competently advised about the Vargas waiver. See Johnson II, 2010 WL 5671780, at *13; 
Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1387 (holding that defendant’s have a right to effective assistance of counsel 
when considering whether to accept a plea agreement). 
 84 See Johnson III, 700 F.3d at 417 (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting). 
 85 See id. at 417–18. 
 86 See id. 
 87 See id. at 416–18; see also Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1408 (discussing the problems with requiring 
certain showings of prejudice when determining a counsel’s ineffective assistance); Strickland, 466 
U.S. at 686 (reasoning that the Sixth Amendment holds defense counsel accountable by requiring 
counsel not to “undermine[] the proper functioning of the adversarial process”). 
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son was not competently advised about the Vargas waiver.88 Even so, Chief 
Judge Kozinski argued that these findings only demonstrated a “mere suspi-
cion” of prejudice and the Strickland test’s prejudice prong requires a stronger 
showing of certainty.89 As the Supreme Court recognized in Frye, because the 
art of negotiating a plea deal is so nuanced and individualized, it is impractical 
to set detailed standards that predict with certainty the adequacy of counsel 
during plea negotiations.90 In other words, by requiring a strong and certain 
showing of prejudice, Chief Judge Kozinski’s position fails to acknowledge the 
inherent difficulties in determining when exactly the ineffective assistance of 
counsel occurred, thus preventing courts from holding defense counsel ac-
countable.91 
By extension, allowing for greater accountability is a boon for indigent 
criminal defendants like Johnson.92 More specifically, the panel’s decision 
helps alleviate an untenable position that many indigent defenders face: public 
defender’s offices, when they are available at all, are typically underfunded.93 
Additionally, many state judges either appoint inexperienced lawyers or deny 
funding for cases that require defense experts and investigations.94 The panel’s 
decision therefore diminishes the inequities that indigent defendants face by 
providing district courts with a clear and pragmatic framework for assessing 
Sixth Amendment challenges involving plea bargains.95 In addition, by deliver-
ing an attainable Sixth Amendment standard that increases accountability for 
all defense attorneys, the panel’s decision diminishes the chance that both an 
appointed counsel and the federal court will prejudice an indigent defendant.96 
                                                                                                                           
 88 See Johnson III, 700 F.3d at 424–27; Johnson II, 2010 WL 5671780, at *13 (detailing the find-
ings of the magistrate judge). 
 89 See Johnson III, 700 F.3d at 416–18 (Kozinski, C.J. dissenting). 
 90 See Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1408. 
 91 See id. at 1407–08 (implying that defense counsel must be held accountable for its responsibili-
ties to provide effective assistance of counsel during the plea bargaining process); Johnson III, 700 
F.3d at 416–18 (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting). 
 92 See Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1407–08; see also Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death 
Sentence Not for the Worst Crime but for the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L.J. 1835, 1844 (1994) (ex-
plaining the problematic realities that indigent defendants face when receiving appointed counsel) 
 93 See Bright, supra note 92, at 1844; see also Johnson III, 700 F.3d at 421 (noting that Johnson 
received representation from his public defender for a few minutes before he was required to appear in 
court). 
 94 See Bright, supra note 92, at 1844. 
 95 See Johnson III, 700 F.3d at 426–28 (demonstrating that a court can determine when a defend-
ant is prejudiced under the Strickland test); Bright, supra note 92, at 1844 (discussing that the minimal 
standards required to provide effective counsel offer little protection for indigent defendants). 
 96 See Johnson III, 700 F.3d at 426–28; Bright, supra note 92, at 1844. 
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CONCLUSION 
The United States Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the district 
court’s finding that Johnson received ineffective assistance of counsel but dis-
agreed with the habeas remedy. Instead of resentencing, the panel vacated the 
guilty plea because Johnson’s counsel provided ineffective assistance through-
out the plea negotiation process, leading to Johnson’s unconstitutional guilty 
plea. Chief Judge Kozinski’s objections are unfounded because the panel 
worked within the established standard of review to find prejudice at an earlier 
stage, which provided a just outcome for a defendant who never enjoyed the 
benefits of effective counsel. As a result, future indigent defenders like John-
son may not have to suffer the injustice of ineffective assistance of counsel to 
such an extent, nor receive an inadequate remedy that adds insult to injury. 
